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‘At its core … globalization is about shifting forms of human contact.’ It is about 
their ‘creation’ and ‘multiplication’, ‘expansion’ and ‘stretching’, ‘intensification’ 
and ‘acceleration’ (Steger, 2003, pp. 8–12). This study focuses on those forms of 
human contact which are triggered by foreign direct investments (FdI).1 made 
with a view to ‘acquir[ing] a lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of 
the economy of the investor’, and to gain a voice in the management of that 
enterprise,2 this form of international economic activity has the potential to 
generate relatively deep and long-lasting social relationships, as compared to 
others such as portfolio investment or trade.
Foreign direct investments create and alter relations between many types 
of human actor – buyers and sellers, employers and employees, suppliers and 
retailers, consumers and producers, shareholders and company officials, regulators 
and regulatees – who may be located in the home states from which investments 
originate, the host states in which investments are made, and beyond. This study 
focuses on interactions between foreign investment, host state civil society, and 
host state government actors. For the purposes of the present study, civil society 
actors are defined as non-governmental, not-for-profit individuals and collectivities 
which seek to express, promote and defend the interests and values – whether 
political, ethical, cultural, scientific, religious or philanthropic – of their members 
or others.3 The term government actors refers to the political figures within national 
and local governments. Unless otherwise specified, it is not intended to refer to 
bureaucrats, whom this study generally treats as part of the legal system.
The foreign investor-government-civil society actor triumvirate is drawn 
together by a common preoccupation with foreign investment – doing, increasing, 
monitoring, controlling or even ending it. But their interests and values often 
diverge or even compete. What role might host state legal systems play in mediating 
relations between civil society, government and foreign investment actors in host 
states? 
Local law
The proliferation of points of contact between local, foreign and international 
legal systems undoubtedly makes it difficult to analyse each in isolation, but to 
focus on state law is still a valid and important undertaking. 
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2 Global Business, Local Law
From the perspective of civil society actors, international law and institutions 
are of  limited relevance in mediating day-to-day relations with government 
and investment actors in host states. For example, the OECd Guidelines for 
multinational Enterprises provide that multinational enterprises should take 
account of their environmental and social impact, but are entirely voluntary 
and implemented by state-based National Contact Points (see OECd mNEs 
Guidelines website).4 True, some comfort can be drawn from developments 
such as the increasing willingness of the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment disputes to accept amicus briefings from civil society actors in 
countries such as Bolivia, Tanzania and Argentina, which began with Methanex 
Corporation v. United States of America (2005). However, this is ‘no golden age 
of civil society participation in investment dispute settlement’, not least because 
it is dominated by civil society actors based in more developed home states 
(Odumosu, 2007, p. 13).5 
From the perspective of governments, international economic laws that restrict 
protectionism, impose conditionality and so on, are an encroachment on national 
policy space. But states still determine ‘which and how much of the remedies 
prescribed in Washington’ to apply, and to which members of its population 
(Randeria, 2003, p. 323). For example, former chief economist of the World Bank 
Joseph Stiglitz has attributed the ability of India (and China) to weather the 1997 
global economic crisis with a healthy growth rate of 5 per cent to the fact that 
it maintained capital controls throughout (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 125). States remain 
‘pivotal’ – the greatest reference point for, and controller of the movements and 
behaviour of, people and business. States secure the legitimacy and accountability 
of those supra- and subnational governance mechanisms that globalists so often 
aggrandise (Hirst et al., 2002, pp. 257, 266–7 and 277 et seq.). Foreign investments 
exist only because state law grants and protects their rights. ‘Without the state, 
the corporation’ – not least the foreign investor – ‘is nothing. Literally nothing’ 
(Bakan, 2004, pp. 153–4). Each entity that makes up a multinational enterprise 
of foreign investment, such as a multinational corporation ‘is subject variously to 
the laws of each and every state in which it does business’ and foreign investors 
are rarely able, as is often suggested, to ‘evade national legislation’ just because 
it may be ‘in their interests to do so’ (Wallace, 2002, pp. 11 and 57).6 ‘All laments 
about the loss of state sovereignty to the contrary’ national legal systems, through 
their ‘legislative enactments, judicial decision-making and administrative (in)
action[,] will continue to affect the way processes of globalization are mediated, 
experienced and resisted in India’ (Randeria, 2003, p. 324) and elsewhere. And 
rightly so. 
A growing body of literature does pay attention to the role of legal systems in 
the home states of investors as a mediator of investor-government-civil society 
relations. For example, home state law has been of some use to foreign civil 
society actors in the US, where the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789 has 
been dusted off  and used with a degree of success to sue private corporations 
for damage resulting from their acts abroad, where those acts are found to 
breach the peremptory norms of international law. Torture and slavery have 
been found to violate peremptory norms, and so to attract damages and other 
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civil remedies. Environmental harms have recently been considered under the 
Act, but the status of international environmental law under the ATCA remains 
somewhat precarious. In the UK, attempts by foreign nationals to sue UK parent 
companies or their foreign subsidiaries in UK courts have faced enormous and 
sometimes unpredictable jurisdictional challenges (see muchlinski, 2007; Perry-
Kessaris, 2007; mank, 2007). The territorial constraints on legislative jurisdiction 
ensure that assistance from the regulatory authorities of home states is rarely 
forthcoming. For example, when a UK-based environmental group complained 
to the UK department of Trade and Industry about the environmental damage 
threatened by a port project involving UK investment in the dahanu region of 
maharastra, it was met with a shrug (Perez, 2002, pp. 19–20). The chances of 
such an institution offering a solution to an Indian civil society actor must be 
impossibly remote. 
Relatively little attention, or respect, is paid to the role of host state legal 
systems in mediating investor-civil society-government relations (Rajagopal, 
2005, p. 347). For example, Oren Perez (2002, pp. 24–5) has dismissed any faith 
in ‘regulatory capabilities of developing countries’ as ‘misguided’.7
Investment climate discourse
One arena in which the relationship between host state legal systems and 
foreign investment has been taken very seriously indeed is that of international 
development. The relationship between national legal systems and foreign 
investment first drew the attention of the World Bank in the late 1990s when its 
publications began to include assertions that host state legal systems – the letter 
of the law, and the manner in which it is implemented and interpreted – are a 
significant determinant of inw rd foreign investment levels (see World Bank, 1995 
and 1996).8 Since 2002, the Bank has begun to refer to national legal systems as 
forming, along with economic and political stability and physical and financial 
infrastructure, part of  a host state’s ‘investment climate’ (World Bank, 2002, 
p. 9). 
The Bank began an Investment Climate Capacity Enhancement Program in 
2003 with a view to supporting ‘the implementation of this corporate priority’. 
Its website includes online forums for ‘communities of practice’ – policy-makers, 
practitioners and researchers interested in investment climate issues (World 
Bank Investment Climate website). For over a decade, the Bank has pioneered 
a range of potentially valuable data sets, including national and subnational 
‘Enterprise’ and ‘doing Business’9 surveys with which to benchmark legal 
systems both objectively, based on the observations of experts, and subjectively, 
based on the perceptions and expectations of foreign investors (see World Bank, 
2005a, pp. 9–14).10 In recent years it has summarised its findings in ‘Investment 
Climate Assessments’, which, as will be seen, have become hard political currency 
within client states. The ‘investment climate’ tag has proved popular with other 
international development agencies, such as the Asian development Bank, and 
with international development policy makers in the United States, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere. The concept was institutionalised by the 2006 
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4 Global Business, Local Law
establishment of an Investment Climate Facility for Africa (see dTI, 2004, p. 95; 
US Commercial Service Country Guide for India website and the Investment 
Climate Facility website). 
Although it answers the need to take host state legal systems seriously, the 
discourse of ‘investment climates’ is far too investor-centric to serve as a framework 
for assessing the role of host state legal systems in investor-government-civil 
society relations. For a start, an understanding of the legal needs of civil society 
and government actors is essential even to an investor-centric approach, because 
their perceptions and expectations of legal systems will inform their legal strategies, 
which in turn will affect foreign investors. Furthermore, we need and ought not 
to begin and end with the perceptions and expectations – supposed or actual – 
of foreign investors. Foreign investors are, quite obviously, not the only actors 
to whom state legal systems are addressed. Government and civil society actors 
(among others) are also potential consumers, and targets, of state legal systems. 
There is a need for an analytical framework which will allow us to place the legal 
needs of governments and of civil society on something approaching the same 
level as those of investors, whilst acknowledging that their interests and values 
may differ widely.
‘Seeking similarity, appreciating difference’
Investment, government and civil society actors are targets of and served by the 
same state legal system, so it is necessary to keep an eye out for what is common 
to their relationships with law. Investment, government and civil society actors 
are all regulated and constrained by state law. Equally, they may be empowered 
by it. It is particularly important to emphasise that government actors are not 
mere custodians of law, they are also consumers and targets of it. In the context 
of the economic liberalisation of a vibrant democracy such as India, the legal 
system is a tool to be used against government actors, as well as by them.
Existing studies of the role of law in foreign investment processes generally 
focus on the perspective either of  foreign investors, or of  those who oppose 
foreign investment, or of those who regulate it. In each study, law is called upon 
to support the individual objectives of a given actor. The product is a patchy 
collection of parallel accounts, which do little to build upon or influence each 
other.11 For example, ‘proponents of security, social justice, and environmental 
protection’ demand rights or regulations to address capitalism’s negative 
externalities and injustices. On the other hand, those who wish to advance 
competition and efficiency, such as the World Bank, seek rights and regulations 
to set the market free (Kagan and Axelrad, 2000, p. 2). Some have examined the 
propensity of investors and government actors to use, abuse and avoid host state 
law in their relations with each other (see Perry-Kessaris, 2004; Hellman et al., 
2000; Haines, 2005; Wang, 2000).12 Others have documented the legal history 
of individual campaigns by civil society actors against foreign investments (see 
Fernandes and Saldanha, 2001; Sanchez-moreno and Higgins, 2004). In the few 
studies which touch upon civil society, government and foreign investment actors, 





































© Ashgate Publishing Ltd
 Introduction 5
tripartite relations between those actors tend not to be placed at the centre (see 
for example, Wallace, 2002; muchlinski, 2007). What is needed is an integrated 
analysis of the interests, values and legal needs of investment, civil society and 
government actors.
Law as a communal resource
For over a decade Roger Cotterrell has advocated the use of a ‘law-and-community’ 
methodology to ‘clarify the contexts in which decisions about regulation must 
be made’ (Cotterrell, 2006b, pp. 5 and 16). He employs a revitalised concept of 
‘community’ to map and evaluate law’s role in social interactions. He argues that 
‘networks of relations of community’ exist wherever there are objectively verifiable 
interactions that are relatively ‘stable and sustained’ and are characterised by 
mutual interpersonal trust. Such interactions, Cotterrell argues, occur across the 
full range of max Weber’s four ideal types of social action: traditional, affective, 
belief  and instrumental (Cotterrell, 1997, pp. 80–2). 
The law-and-community approach enables us to ‘seek similarity’ (Cotterrell, 
2002b, p. 49) because it highlights a universal role which law can and ought to 
fulfil in respect of all social interactions: the support of mutual interpersonal 
trust. Such trust is, Cotterrell argues, the cause and the effect of the interactions 
and sense of belonging that characterise relations of community. It ‘encourages 
future interaction and provides the motiv tion to engage in relatively free, 
uncalculated relations with each other’ (Cotterrell, 2006b, pp. 73–4). drawing on 
Cotterrell’s work, it is possible to identify three ways in which law supports trust 
and, thereby, the productivity that is characteristic of community-like relations. 
It expresses, in the form of contracts, institutions and so on, the trust that holds 
actors together; it draws actors in further by ensuring their participation in social 
life; and it coordinates the differences that hold actors – and different networks 
of community.
Just as an integrated analysis of multiple interests and values necessitates and 
facilitates the appreciation of similarities, it also necessitates and facilitates the 
identification of differences. Flexible, yet robust, law-and-community analysis 
allows us simultaneously to hold in mind a broad range of contemporary actors 
and their ‘fluctuating’, ‘overlapping’, complex and transnational relations 
(Cotterrell, 2006b, pp. 7 and 67). We become able to ‘appreciate difference’ in 
the values, interests and legal needs that are central to each of these relations 
(Cotterrell, 2002b, p. 49). For example, government actors tend to hold a uniquely 
privileged position in respect of the production and implementation of law, and 
are sometimes able to act as gatekeepers to the legal system. By contrast, civil 
society actors might be expected to regard law as hierarchical, interventionist, 
hostile and alien. A further distinction might be drawn, using the terminology of 
Sarat and Scheingold (1998), between the overtly value-laden ‘cause lawyering’ in 
which civil society actors are primarily engaged, and the ostensibly ‘value-neutral 
mainstream lawyering’ favoured by foreign investors (Sarat and Scheingold, 
2007, p. 8). 
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Such an appreciation of difference – in interests and values and, therefore, in 
legal needs – is ‘particularly necessary today when the importance of instrumental 
economic relations is so strongly emphasised politically, and legal analysis 
seems impelled towards a similar emphasis’ (Cotterrell, 2002b, p. 78). Economic 
values, such as efficiency and competition, are used to evaluate an ever-wider 
range of social relations, including those which take place through legal systems. 
Furthermore, it is increasingly accepted that the interests of those engaged in 
instrumental economic relations ought to be promoted ahead of those engaged 
in other forms of  social relations. This preoccupation with liberal economic 
values and interests is narrowing socio-legal landscapes across the globe through 
processes which Bronwen morgan (2003) has termed ‘thick meta-regulation’. 
The possibility of particular concern to the present study is that liberal economic 
values and interests may be challenging the present and future capacity of national 
legal systems to act as communal resource in investor-government-civil society 
relations.
What follows
The present study explores the role of state legal systems in foreign investor-
government-civil society relations through a law-and-community lens. It first 
outlines how state legal systems might secure the productivity of community-like 
relations in general (Chapter 2). The aim is to produce a theoretical framework for 
the analysis of law and foreign investment, which may be applied in any location. 
This analytical framework is then applied to foreign investor-government-civil 
society relations in and around the city of Bengaluru (formerly Bangalore), capital 
of the southern Indian State of Karnataka (Chapters 3 to 6).13
much of the material for this case study was collected in elite semi-structured 
interviews lasting for one to two hours with individuals such as investors, lawyers, 
business advisors, commentators, bureaucrats and civil society representatives in 
Bengaluru (2003) and London (2005 and 2006). Interviewees were selected partly 
because of their designation – for example, all the foreign government-appointed 
advisers to foreign investors in the city; and partly by recommendation – for 
example, journalists or academics proposed by other interviewees as experts on 
foreign investment.
General trends in the comments of interviewees are reported, supported by 
illustrative quotations. Interviewees are only referred to individually when they are 
responsible for a specific quotation. The identities of interviewees have been kept 
confidential, but their general designation can be derived from their code.14 
In order to maintain flow, accessibility and appeal across disciplinary and 
geographical divides, much of the technical and location-specific detail is placed 
in footnotes where it may be pursued by those with a special interest. 
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Notes
1 This study follows the UNCTAd definition of foreign direct investment which is 
in turn based on the definitions contained in the fifth edition of the International 
monetary Fund’s Balance of  Payments manual, devised in 1993 and known as 
BPm5; and the third edition of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
development’s detailed Benchmark definition of Foreign direct Investment devised 
in 1996 and known as Bd3. The foreign entity making the investment is known as the 
‘direct investor’; and the enterprise in which the investment is made – whether its an 
unincorporated branch or incorporated subsidiary – is known as a ‘direct investment 
enterprise’ (UNCTAd website, October 2006).
2 The resulting control may not be complete, but it implies some level of  equity 
ownership by the investor in the investment enterprise, generally agreed to be a 
minimum of 10 per cent.
3 This is a modified form of the World Bank definition which can be seen on the World 
Bank Civil Society Topic website.
4 The World Bank inspection procedure is an example of a more forceful mechanism. 
For example, in 1998, an NGO filed a Request for Inspection with the World 
Bank in which it alleged that there had been inadequate consultation of  tribal 
and NGO viewpoints during the preparation of plans for an ‘eco-development’ in 
the Nagarahole area of Karnataka. The World Bank Inspection Panel found that 
consultation had indeed been inadequate according to its own policy, and that as a 
result the project was in some respects flawed. It recommended an investigation by 
the Executive directors of the Bank (Inspection Panel of the World Bank, 1998, 
pp. 1–4). However, the procedure only applies to World Bank projects. 
5 Partnership with international and foreign civil society actors can be useful. For 
example, international opposition to India’s dahanu port came from WWF-UK and 
Global Action Response and the World development movement, each of which took 
action to raise awareness about the project (Perez, 2002, p. 15). Some commentators 
have criticised that lack of interaction between Indian and foreign activists arguing 
that India has missed opportunities for support and inspiration (Khaitan, 2004, 
p. 7). However, these relationships can become oppressive. For example, the Indian-
based movement against World Bank-financed Narmada dam maintained links with 
transnational anti-World Bank campaigns. These foreign groups came to dictate the 
‘agendas and priorities’, the ‘vocabulary’ and the ‘timing of local action’ (Randeria, 
2003, p. 316).
6 Of course, the attention of foreign investors may be genuinely distracted from host 
state legal system by the fact that they will be continue to be subject to regulation – 
such as financial reporting standards – in their home state. Alternatively, investors 
may seek to use foreign standards as an excuse for breaching local standards. For 
example, when certain States partially banned Coca Cola and PepsiCo products 
because they allegedly contained pesticides, Coca Cola responded by declaring the 
pesticide levels to be within the limits allowed in the European Union (BBC News 
Online, 2006).
7 This is a somewhat surprising conclusion, given that the case he examined, resistance 
to the building of a Port in the ecologically sensitive dahanu region of the Indian 
state of maharastra, was solved by a particularly Indian solution: the creation by 
the judiciary of a hybrid authority which eventually prevented the port from being 
built (Perez, 2002, p. 14).
8 For the development of World Bank legal reform, see Santos, 2006.
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9 For a detailed critique of the doing Business project, see davis and Kruse, 2007.
10 Enterprise surveys have incorporated two earlier forms of  investor perception 
indicators: World Business Environment Surveys and Investment Climate Surveys. 
The former are still freely available on the dedicated website.
11 Bronwen morgan has noted a further important schism in empirically-grounded, 
socio-legal work generally, which addresses the role of law in social change either 
in terms of rights or in terms of regulation. ‘Rights scholarship’ tends to address 
‘mobilization, social change, questions of identity and culture, to adopt the viewpoint 
of the ‘disadvantaged or oppressed’, and to focus on their ‘claims of individualized 
entitlement’ and their use of  ‘judicial avenues’. By contrast ‘regulation scholars 
are more typically concerned with questions of economic efficiency, the evaluation 
of results, rational design of institutions and bureaucratic or discretionary modes 
of pursuing public interests’. Rights scholarship is often concerned with ‘naming, 
blaming and claiming’, while regulation tends to focus on ‘rule-making, monitoring 
and implementation’. But it is in some ways more useful to think of a ‘six-fold 
process of disputing (naming, blaming and claiming, rule-making, monitoring and 
implementation)’, with the emphasis on rights or regulation being determined at the 
point when a claim is made (morgan, 2007, pp. 2, 3 and 11).
12 See also World Bank, 2004a, p. 40.
13 In November of 2006, Bangalore was officially re-named Bengaluru to bring the 
city closer to its pre-colonial, Kannada name of Benda Kaal Ooru. It is important 
to note that ‘communal’ has a different, negative, m aning in India, where it denotes 
antagonisms between different social groupings, especially between muslims and 
Hindus.
14 Interviewees are first designated as local (L) or foreign (F); and then according to 
their role as civil society actor (CS), lawyer (L), commentator (C), investment actor 
(I), adviser to foreign investors (A), or government actor (G). Finally they are given 
a number. So for example Interview LCS01 refers to an interview with a local civil 
society actor. 
